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INTRODUCTION 
The increased complexity of technological features and a growing pace of 
innovation are forcing the innovation industry to adopt new research and 
development (R&D) strategies.  Indeed, the production of most of today’s 
technologies requires a variety of machines and processes that are significantly 
more diverse than those available in any single firm.  In addition, the nature of 
firms is changing and as firms have a tendency to become smaller, there is a 
greater need for access to technologies that small firms cannot develop 
themselves.  An increase in technology diffusion is also needed to address 
global challenges such as climate change and human health.  For these reasons, 
there is a need for strategic alliances and innovative licensing agreements 
among industries.1  At a time when technology diffusion is thus more needed 
than ever before, new solutions are required.  However, in the absence of 
efficient forums, licensors, and licensees miss important opportunities in 
valuing intellectual property assets and diffusing technology.  The emergence 
of patent markets where patents have become tradable assets can therefore 
present a unique opportunity, as these markets appear to be a relevant way of 
getting around the anti-commons. 
Furthermore, patent markets are of interest in the current fair, reasonable, 
and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licensing debate.2  As flagged by the recent 
amicus curiae submission presented by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
in Apple v. Motorola,3 FRAND licensing commitments are central to the fight 
against anticompetitive practices in the much needed, but highly complex, 
standard setting processes.  In our interconnected society ruled by technology 
intensive devices, industry has come together to institute standard-setting 
organizations (SSOs), which are industry groups establishing technical models, 
rules, and principles authoritative in a particular industry.  These organizations 
have become increasingly important and promote innovation as well as 
interoperability of products.4  Standard setting and standard-essential patents 
 
1. See, e.g., THEODORE HAGELIN, TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION LAW AND PRACTICE, 5–6 
(2011); John Barton, New Trends in Technology Transfer: Implications for National and International 
Policy, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY 313, 314 
(Frederick M. Abbott et al. eds., 2d ed. 2011). 
2. In the United States, it seems that RAND commitments (hence dropping the ‘fair’ 
requirement) are more common than FRAND ones, which appear more frequently in Europe.  To adopt 
a global approach to the issue, this article will nevertheless refer to “FRAND.” 
3. Oversight of the Impact on Competition of Exclusion Orders to Enforce Standard-Essential 
Patents: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 11 (2012) [hereinafter Standard-
Essential Patents Hearing] (statement of Edith Ramirez, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n). 
4. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard Setting 
Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1892 (2002); Alan Devlin, Standard-Setting and the Failure of 
Price Competition, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 217 (2009-2010); Joseph Farrell et al., Standard 
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can nevertheless be problematic from an antitrust point of view.  This issue has 
been receiving a lot of attention lately, notably because of numerous litigations 
in the high-tech industry.  Illustrative of these debates surrounding standard 
setting processes is the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on 
Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights’ hearing on “Standard 
Essential Patent Disputes and Antitrust Law” held on July 30, 2013.5  
Conscious of the competition issues caused by standard-essential patents, SSOs 
have adopted rules that control the disclosure and licensing of such patents.  
One of these rules is the requirement of FRAND licensing commitments by 
standard-essential patent owners.6  These commitments have however proved 
difficult to enforce. Innovative implementation tools are therefore needed and 
patent markets may be relevant in establishing FRAND terms. 
The aim of this article is to analyze the legal opportunities presented by 
patent markets for technology diffusion, as well as the role of patent markets as 
tools in establishing and fulfilling FRAND terms.  As an illustration, the article 
will focus on the system established by Intellectual Property Exchange 
International Inc. (IPXI), an intellectual property platform already carrying 
55,000 patents from Ford, Sony America, Philips, Com-Pac, MetaPower and 
Hewlett-Packard among others.  The article focuses primarily on patents and 
patent markets because they are most central to technology diffusion and 
FRAND licensing issues.  Patent licensing activities are therefore at the core of 
our analysis. As put forth by distinguished commentators, “[l]icensing [is] . . .  
the predominant transaction model in the information economy.”7  The reason 
 
Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603 (2007); Alden F. Abbott & Nicholas J. Kim, 
Standard Setting and Hold-ups Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, in  
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW: NEW FRONTIERS 325 (Steven Anderman & Ariel 
Ezrachi eds., 2011); Michael A. Carrier, Standard Setting Analysis Under U.S. Law, in  INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW: NEW FRONTIERS 355 (Steven Anderman & Ariel Ezrachi eds., 
2011); Philippe Chappatte & Paul Walker, European Competition Law, Non-Practicing Entities, and 
FRAND Commitments, in  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW: NEW FRONTIERS 373 
(Steven Anderman & Ariel Ezrachi eds., 2011); Roger G. Brooks & Damien Geradin, Taking 
Contracts Seriously: The Meaning of the Voluntary Commitment to License Essential Patents on ‘Fair 
and Reasonable’ Terms, in  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW: NEW FRONTIERS 389 
(Steven Anderman & Ariel Ezrachi eds., 2011). 
5. Standard Essential Patent Disputes and Antitrust Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Antitrust, Competition Policy & Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 
(2013), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=042c67570e0fe19705
acabbb8230ee0c (last visited Aug. 1, 2013).  
6. See generally Abbott & Kim, supra note 4; Carrier, supra note 4; Chappatte & Walker, supra 
at note 4; Brooks & Geradin, supra at note 4; Anne Layne-Farrar et al., Pricing Patents For Licensing 
in Standard-Setting Organizations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 
679–85 (2007).  
7. ROBERT W. GOMULKIEWICZ ET AL., LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY – LAW AND 
APPLICATION 3, 18 (2d ed. 2011). 
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for this success appears to be a combination of increasing needs for 
technologies from the demand side, and the recognition of the flexible solutions 
offered by licensing activities.  Nevertheless, other intellectual property rights 
can be of relevance in the technology diffusion and FRAND discussions.  
Therefore intellectual property rights will be addressed when appropriate. 
The first section of this article explains how licensing can be used to 
enhance technology diffusion, and then introduce the process of standard 
setting as well as the concept of FRAND licensing terms.  The second section, 
presents how the intellectual property market emerged and recount the 
milestones in the market building process.  The third section then introduces 
one of the most sophisticated intellectual property market platforms at the 
present: the IPXI.  Finally, this article assesses whether patent markets can be 
relevant as an incentive towards enhanced technology diffusion and as helpful 
criteria in defining and meeting FRAND licensing terms. 
 
I.  LICENSING AND TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION 
A.  Why Patent Licensing Enhances Technology Diffusion 
Patents appear as both an incentive and a barrier to technology diffusion. 
As stated by Rudolph Peritz, “patent protection is the private incentive 
necessary to spur invention and at the same time the social cost that prevents 
its optimal use.”8  Patents are legal and financial barriers to technology 
diffusion because they slow the rate of access to technologies, complicate the 
access process in general, and make technologies more expensive.  Indeed, 
proprietary products undoubtedly cost more than generic ones.  Moreover, 
patents can be barriers to accessing technologies as right holders may simply 
refuse to license a technology to competing manufacturers or to those in certain 
countries. 
On the other hand, one of the central arguments put forward by proponents 
of strong intellectual property rights regimes, and underlying the adoption of 
the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), is that such 
approaches not only increase innovation by firms, but also favor increased 
 
8. Rudolf J.R. Peritz, Competition Within Intellectual Property Regimes: The Instance of Patent 
Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW: NEW FRONTIERS 27, 34 (Steven 
Anderman & Ariel Ezrachi eds., 2011).  On the trade-off between inventiveness and underutilization, 
see generally, Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in 
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609 (R. 
Nelson ed., 1962).   
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diffusion of technologies.9  It is important to distinguish between the role of 
intellectual property rights as incentives to innovation, and their role in 
enhancing technology diffusion.  Although it falls outside of the scope of the 
present study to analyze this distinction, we will briefly present both incentives 
separately. 
The justification behind the exclusive rights granted by patents and other 
intellectual property rights is precisely to provide a private incentive in favor 
of innovation.  The U.S. Constitution indeed provides that Congress has the 
power “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”10  As underlined by the U.S. Department of 
Justice’s Antitrust Division in a recent statement, 
[p]atents, provided for in Article I of the U.S. Constitution have long 
played a central role in promoting innovation and economic growth by 
encouraging individuals and companies to apply their knowledge, take 
risks and invest in research and development to create a new product or 
process.11 
Since development of new technologies is largely led by private corporations 
driven by market incentives, intellectual property regimes appear to be 
incentives in favor of technology innovation as they reward inventors’ efforts 
and investments.  As stated by Mark Lemley, “[i]ntellectual creations are public 
goods that are much easier and cheaper to copy than they are to produce in the 
first place.  Absent some form of exclusive right over inventions, no one (or not 
enough people) will bother to innovate.”12  Moreover, the protection offered by 
patents encourages firms and inventors to put products on the market and is, 
therefore, an incentive to design around the patented products.  Some 
commentators have furthermore underlined that stronger intellectual property 
rights may facilitate the development of specialized technology markets.13  The 
existence of intellectual property regimes is hence necessary to secure and 
boost research and innovation. 
 
9. See, e.g., Lee G. Branstetter, Do stronger patents induce more local innovation?, in 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 309, 311–16 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005). 
10. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).  
11. Renata Hesse, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of 
Justice, Six “Small” Proposals for SSOs Before Lunch, Remarks as Prepared for the ITU-T Patent 
Roundtable, 3,  Remarks Prepared for the ITU-T Patent Roundtable Geneva, Switzerland (October 10, 
2012).  
12. Lemley, supra note 4, at 1892.  
13. Branstetter, supra note 9, at 316.  
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The role of patents in diffusing technology stems from both the disclosure 
requirement in patent applications and any licensing agreements that may be 
subsequently entered into.  The patenting of an invention indeed requires that 
the inventor disclose its invention in its application to the Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO),14 thus revealing major technological information on the 
invention.  This information will be precious in order to avoid R&D overlaps 
and to direct R&D in the industry.  Moreover, licenses gran licensees the right 
to use intellectual property content otherwise protected by exclusive rights.  
More precisely, a license “conveys the patentee’s permission to enjoy 
exclusively or non-exclusively some or all of the statutory exclusionary rights 
under [patent law] for a limited time and purpose, within a geographic area, and 
in certain distribution channel[s].”15  Licensing contracts should also contain 
all the relevant knowledge to allow the licensee to work with the technology, 
thus diffusing additional technological information. A licensing operation may 
further involve technical assistance and know-how, which are needed to adopt 
and adapt the relevant technology. 
Licensing activities are complex and may occur either within firms or 
between unrelated entities and concern a broad range of actors, from big 
multinational companies to small start-ups and universities.  Moreover, they 
can be international transactions submitted to numerous legal regimes.  The 
licensing of technologies leads to important diffusion of technologies. As stated 
by an expert in the field, “[t]hrough licensing, [intellectual property] becomes 
the legal embodiment of collaboration, which allows for an entire industry to 
adopt a single enabling technology.”16  Technologies thus ‘spill over’ from one 
person or entity to another, and licensing operations are therefore one of the 
channels through which technologies may be diffused.  This process has been 
identified as a ‘value-added process’ where “[e]ach firm in the chain adds value 
to the technology as it incorporates it core competence . . . into the 
technology.”17  As the number of granted patents is significantly increasing 
every year, both nationally and internationally, patents and subsequent 
licensing operations undoubtedly contribute to worldwide increased technology 
diffusion.18  To this respect, a number of studies show a clear link between 
 
14. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2013) (unchanged under the America Invents Act); TRIPS: Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, art. 3, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS 
OF THE URGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 320 (1999), 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299, art. 29 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].  
15. GOMULKIEWICZ ET AL., supra note 7, at 202. 
16. Ian D. McClure & James E. Malackowski, The Next Big Thing in Monetizing IP: A Natural 
Progression to Exchange-Traded Units, 3(5) LANDSLIDE 1, 2 (May/June 2011). 
17. HAGELIN, supra note 1, at 5.   
18. See Strong Growth in Demand for Intellectual Property Rights in 2012, WORLD 
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patents and technology transactions.19  Specifically, increases in patent 
protection have been proved to heighten licensing propensity.20  It has equally 
been demonstrated that patent grants increase the probability that a licensing 
agreement will be achieved.21 
Interestingly, technology diffusion appears as one of the core objectives of 
the TRIPS Agreement, which states that: 
[t]he protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should 
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the 
transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of 
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner 
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights 
and obligations.22 
Moreover, technology diffusion is a fundamental principle of the Agreement.23  
The importance of both articles was further reinforced by both the Doha 
Declaration and the Doha Ministerial Declaration,24 which made technology 
diffusion one of the fundamental aims of international intellectual property law. 
For sure, the patent system and the licensing approach are far from being 
perfect solutions.  Some commentators have even argued that “patents today 
constitute a brake on innovation, not a roadblock.”25  Moreover, the step from 
innovation to diffusion is extremely complex, albeit outside of the scope of the 
present article.  Other means of encouraging and diffusing innovations have 
been identified.  With respect to innovation, one should not underestimate the 
impact of the social and professional recognition enshrined in the publication 
 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/
articles/2013/article_0006.html. For U.S. statistics see, e.g., Statistics, UNITED STATES PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE (May 13, 2011, 2:32:46 PM), http://www.uspto.gov/about/stats/index.jsp.  
19. See, e.g., Gaétan de Rassenfosse, How SMEs exploit their intellectual property assets: 
Evidence from survey data, 39 SMALL BUS. ECON. 437, 441 (2012).  
20. See, e.g., Ashish Arora & Marco Ceccagnoli, Patent Protection, Complementary Assets, 
and Firms’ Incentives for Technology Licensing, 52(2) MGMT. SCI. 293, 293 (2006).  
21. See, e.g., Joshua Gans et al., The Impact of Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights on the 
Market for Ideas: Evidence from Patent Grant Delays, 54(5) MGMT. SCI. 982 (May 2008).  
22. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 7 (emphasis added).  
23. Id at art. 8 ¶ 2 (emphasis added).  
24. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 Nov. 2001, ¶ 9, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) (Doha Declaration) and World Trade Organization, 
Ministerial Declaration of 14 Nov. 2001, ¶ 4, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, I.L.M. 746 (2002).  For more 
details see notably Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER WTO RULES INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE WTO VOLUME I,152, 152–55 (Carlos M. Correa ed., 2010).   
25. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS 
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 145 (2008). 
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industry as well as in academic and private prizes such as the Nobel Prizes.  In 
the same line, a great amount of knowledge is disseminated through scientific 
reviews and other journals. 
Going further, a traditional answer to enhancing access to proprietary 
technologies has been compulsory licensing, a state-created liability rule 
entitlement.26  As explained by Robert Merges, the compulsory licensing 
approach means that “[l]egislation granting [intellectual property rights] is 
conditioned . . . with a statutory mandate that the rights must be licensed to all 
comers willing to pay the pre-set price.”27  Because compulsory licensing 
ensures access to technologies while reducing transaction costs, this approach 
has played an important role in the technology diffusion debate.28  However, 
compulsory licensing presents great political difficulties and is equally subject 
to lock-in consequences.29  Another approach that has been suggested in order 
to enhance access to proprietary technologies is the reliance on privately 
established Collective Rights Organizations (CROs).30  Like intellectual 
property markets, CROs are based on property rule entitlements and establish 
private transactional mechanisms (also referred to as private orderings).  
Therefore in a CRO, members, not courts, set the price of the technologies.31 
Compared to compulsory licensing, CROs present two distinct advantages: 
“expert tailoring and reduced political economy problems.”32  But in order to 
be efficient, the CRO approach needs a repeat-play bargaining scheme.33  
Another strategy relevant in enhancing access to proprietary technologies is the 
establishment of patent pools, a form of CRO where “multiple patent holders 
assign or license their individual rights to a central entity, which in turn exploits 
the collective rights by licensing, manufacturing, or both.”34  In a patent pool, 
access to technologies can be free35 or at a price set by the pool.  Patent pools 
 
26. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and 
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1308–17 (1996). 
27. Id. at 1295. On compulsory licensing and energy technologies see, e.g., MATTHEW 
RIMMER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CLIMATE CHANGE: INVENTING CLEAN TECHNOLOGIES 
236–71 (2011). 
28. See, e.g., Richard Li-Dar Wang, Reflections on a Second Thought, in THE ENFORCEMENT 
OF PATENTS 61, 61–64 (Kung-Chung Liu & Reto M. Hilty eds.,  2011); CYNTHIA M. HO, ACCESS TO 
MEDICINE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON PATENTS AND RELATED 
RIGHTS 125–222 (2011).  
29. Merges, supra note 26, at 1295–96, 1299, 1307–17.  
30. See, e.g., id. at 1295. 
31. Id. at 1328.  
32. Id. at 1295.  
33. Id. at 1296. 
34. Id. at 1340.  
35. One example of a pool where patented technologies are available without royalties is the 
Eco-Patent Commons. See Eco-Patent Commons, WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 
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are often very efficient in lowering transaction costs but they may also be used 
in order to implement cartels, and therefore, should be taken with caution.36  
Although it is outside of the scope of the present paper to analyze further the 
approaches mentioned, it is important to acknowledge that there are many 
factors and strategies that enhance innovation and diffusion of technologies. 
As demonstrated earlier, licensing operations support technology diffusion 
because they allow for substantial technological information to be exchanged 
and ultimately disseminated.  From a diffusion perspective, licensing should 
therefore be encouraged.  However, licensing activities are often difficult to set 
and require for certain conditions to be met.  In particular, licensors and 
licensees must be able to agree on licensing terms, and, to do so, they need to 
find a forum where they can exchange information and negotiate.  Nevertheless, 
the reality of intellectual property licensing is quite complicated as licensing 
transactions are often anything but transparent.  Licensors fear infringements 
and abuses and do not trust the available judicial options as efficient guarantees.  
Rather than valuing their intellectual property assets by licensing them, they 
therefore commonly underexploit them.  On the other hand, licensees 
frequently lack leverage in negotiations and thus either fail to obtain licensing 
rights altogether or acquire rights but fail to achieve efficient and fair licensing 
terms.  Licensing deals further take a long time to negotiate and are thus quite 
costly for all parties. 
Based on this assessment, the main issues with respect to licensing 
opportunities appear to be: a) lack of transparency in the agreement processes, 
b) leverage concerns, c) lack of time efficiency and the fact that licensing 
processes are lawyer-intensive, and d) general dissatisfaction with the available 
legal framework.  Because of these weaknesses, and in the absence of efficient 
forum, licensors and licensees miss important opportunities in valuing 
intellectual property assets and diffusing technology.  In Section IV of this 
article, I will assess whether patent markets could be relevant in tackling some 
of the identified issues. 
B.  Standard Setting and FRAND Terms 
In the 1800s, the need for standardized time so that trains could run on 
schedule was met by railroads that began adopting standard time in both Great 
Britain (1840) and the U.S. (1883).37  Today, in an interconnected society ruled 
by technology intensive devices, standards, SSOs, as well as standard-
 
(WBCSD), http://www.wbcsd.org/work-program/capacity-building/eco-patent-commons.aspx (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2014).  
36. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 26, at 1340.  
37. HESSE, supra note 11, at 3–4.  
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developing organizations (SDOs) have become increasingly important.  
Standardization may take numerous organizational forms.38  While some 
standards are mandatory because they represent legal requirements (de jure 
standards),39 most standards are only voluntary. SSOs and SDOs can moreover 
be international,40 regional,41 or national;42 and can be governmental, 43quasi-
governmental, or non-governmental entities.44 Private SSOs and SDOs are 
bodies composed of markets and other actors who collaborate in order to 
establish uniform technical specifications for particular industries.  My analysis 
focuses on standards voluntarily set by these private industry groups. 
The establishment of standards presents numerous benefits.45  As described 
by the District Court in Motion v. Motorola, 
Standards are important for several reasons.  First, they facilitate the 
adoption and advancement of technology as well as the development of 
products that can interoperate with one another.  Standards also lower 
costs by increasing product manufacturing volume, and they increase 
 
38. On the organizational forms of standardization, see, e.g., Lemley, supra note 4, at 1898–
1901.  
39. For example, minimum standards can be compulsory in implementing health or 
environmental statutes.  
40. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO), founded in 1947, is the world’s 
largest developer of voluntary International Standards.  ISO is a network of national standards bodies 
that make up the ISO membership and represent ISO in their country.  As an illustration, ISO’s most 
popular standards are ISO 9000 (quality management), ISO 14000 (environmental management), ISO 
26000 (social responsibility), ISO 50001 (energy management), ISO 31000 (risk management) and 
ISO 22000 (food safety management).  See INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, 
http://www.iso.org/iso/home.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2013). Another important international 
organization is the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the United Nations’ specialized 
agency for information and communication technologies.  ITU was founded in 1865 as the 
International Telegraph Union and in 1947 it became a specialized agency of the United Nations. In 
addition to ITU’s 193 Member States, ITU membership includes ICT regulators, leading academic 
institutions and some 700 private companies.  See INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, 
http://www.itu.int/en/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Aug. 2, 2013).  
41. See, e.g., the Pan American Standards Commission, COPANT,  http://www.copant.org/ 
(last visited Aug. 2, 2013); the European Committee for Standardization, CEN,  
http://www.cen.eu/cen/pages/default.aspx (last visited Aug. 2, 2013); the Pacific Area Standards 
Congress, PACIFIC AREA STANDARDS CONGRESS, http://www.pascnet.org/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2013); 
and the African Organization for Standardisation, AFRICAN ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDISATION, 
http://www.arso-oran.org/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2013).  
42. In the U.S., the national standards body is the American National Standards Institute 
(ANSI), founded in 1918. See AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS INSTITUTE, http://www.ansi.org/ 
(last visited Aug. 2, 2013).  
43. Id.  
44. See, e.g., The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). W3C, http://www.w3.org/ (last visited 
Aug. 2, 2013).  
45. For a detailed analysis of the value of standardization, see, e.g., Lemley, supra note 4, at 
1896–98.  
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price competition by eliminating “switching costs” for consumers who 
desire to switch from products manufactured by one firm to those 
manufactured by another.  They also lead to earlier adoption of new 
technology.46 
Standards are thus set to ensure products and services are safe, interoperable, 
and competitive, which protect and benefit consumers.  Standards also benefit 
technology producers, as they provide baselines for R&D and hence reduce the 
cost and risk in R&D.47  As put forth by the Third Circuit in Broadcom, “[t]he 
adoption of a standard does not eliminate competition among producers but, 
rather, moves the focus away from the development of potential standards and 
toward the development of means for implementing the chosen standard.”48  
These benefits have been reiterated in the recent opinion by Judge Robart in the 
Western District of Washington regarding smart phone patents in the Microsoft 
v. Motorola case.49  Because of these positive features, standard setting should 
be encouraged. 
Nevertheless, standards can have dangerous and sometimes illegal 
anticompetitive effects by excluding a competitor from a market or obtaining 
an unjustifiably higher price for a technology.  In the words of Judge Posner, 
“once a patent becomes essential to a standard, the patentee’s bargaining power 
surges because a prospective licensee has no alternative to licensing the patent; 
he is at the patentee’s mercy.”50  The phenomenon is often referred to as ‘patent 
hold-up’ and identifies situations where, after a standard has been set, a patent 
owner benefits from a strong reduction in rivalry and thus gains consequent but 
illegitimate leverage in licensing processes because its patent has become key 
to the new standard.51  Indeed, in cases of unreasonable bargaining power and 
undue leverage in negotiations, “the connection between the value of an 
invention and its reward—a connection that is the cornerstone of the patent 
system”52 is broken. 
 
46. Research in Motion Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 788, 790 (N.D. Tex. 2008).  
47. On the benefits of standards see, e.g., Patrick Curran, Standard-Setting Organizations: 
Patents, Price Fixing, and Per Se Legality, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 983, 985, 989 (2003).  
48. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 309 (3d Cir. 2007).  
49. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10–1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, ¶¶ 12, 13, 51, 
70 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013).  
50. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913 (N.D. Ill.2012).  
51. On the economics of patents and opportunism, see, e.g., Farrell et al., supra note 4, at 610, 
647. On patent hold-up and royalties see Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty 
Staking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007).   
52. Brief for the Federal Trade Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, at 5, 
Apple Inc. v. Motorola Inc., 896 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913 (N.D. Ill.2012) (Nos. 2012-1548, 2012-1549 
(Fed. Cir. Dec. 14, 2012), 2012 WL 6655899 [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae FTC]). On July 24, 
2013, the FTC finalized the settlement in the Google Motorola mobility case.  The Final Order requires 
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If monopoly power and anticompetitive conduct is established, patent hold-
up may be illegal under Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibiting 
monopolization of or attempt to monopolize trade or commerce.53  Patent hold-
up may equally be illegal under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act.54  In Allied Tube, the Supreme Court therefore recognized the 
anticompetitive character of conduct that undermines the precompetitive 
benefits of private standards.55  Moreover, patent hold-ups threaten the 
acknowledged benefits of standardization and hurt competitors in the 
participating industries, as well as innovation in general and downstream 
customers.56 
To bar owners of essential patents from abusing their undue market power, 
SSOs have adopted rules, policies, and procedures that control the disclosure 
and licensing of essential patents.57  Notably, when a member of a SSO holds a 
patent covering a potential standard, such patent must be disclosed to all the 
members (disclosure obligation).58  Moreover, owners of essential patents must 
often commit to licensing the relevant technology on FRAND terms (licensing 
rule).59  SSOs hence have rules dictating the behavior of patent owners before 
an organization agrees on a standard (ex ante obligations),60 as well as rules 
 
Google to abide by its commitments to license its standard-essential patents on FRAND terms, alleging 
that Google had reneged on these commitments and pursued – or threatened to pursue – injunctions 
and exclusion orders against firms that needed to use standard-essential patents held by Google’s 
subsidiary, Motorola, and were willing to license these patents on FRAND terms.  The Commission 
vote approving the final order was 2-1-1. See Motorola Mobility LLC and Google Inc., No. 1210120 
2013 WL 3944149 (F.T.C. July 23, 2013), available at http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210120/130724
googlemotorolado.pdf.   
53. Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act) of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). On monopoly power 
and anticompetitive conduct, see the Third Circuit’s analysis in Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 
501 F.3d 297, 306–14 (3d Cir. 2007).  On the refusing to license essential patents on FRAND terms 
see, e.g., Robert A. Matthews, Jr., 5 ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 34:53.50 (updated Feb. 2013) 
(Refusing to license an “essential” patent on FRAND terms).  
54. Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).  On standard 
setting and hold-up under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.  See, e.g., Alden F. Abbott & 
Nicholas J. Kim, Standard Setting and Hold-Ups under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW: NEW FRONTIERS, 325, 325–54 (Steven 
Anderman & Ariel Ezrachi eds., 2011).  
55. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 499–500 (1988).  
56. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae FTC, supra note 52, at 16.  On standards hold-up as a 
competition problem see also Farrell et al., supra note 4, at 644.  
57. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 4, at 1903–08. See also, Research In Motion Ltd. v. Motorola, 
Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 788, 791 (N.D. Tex. 2008).  
58. See, e.g., Farrell et al., supra, note 4, at 624.  
59. On FRAND terms see, generally, Abbott & Kim, supra note 4; Carrier, supra note 4; 
Chappatte & Walker, supra note 4, Brooks & Geradin, supra note 4; and Layne-Farrar et al., supra 
note 6, at 671.  
60. On what SSOs can do ex ante to prevent patent hold up, see Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things 
To Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (And One Not To), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149, 158 (2007).  
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governing licensing processes and other negotiations after a standard has been 
set (ex post obligations).61 
FRAND licensing rules designate the terms under which the patent asset 
will be licensed but do not specify any monetary terms.  As stated by 
distinguished commentators, “‘[f]air,’, ‘reasonable,’ and ‘non-discriminatory 
are an interesting collection of commonly used, but emotion-laden words that 
become even more emotionally charged when strung together.”62  FRAND 
terms are hence nebulous but have never been defined by SSOs.  Interestingly, 
some commentators argue that SSOs leave FRAND language “intentionally 
vague in order to avoid liability for price fixing.”63  Some go even further and 
state that “generally prevailing policies of [SSOs] enable and indeed 
affirmatively facilitate ‘gaming the system.’”64 Interestingly, the American 
National Standards Institute (ANSI)’s Patent Policy say nothing about the ex 
ante determination of FRAND licensing terms, but the Guidelines for 
Implementation of the Policy declare: 
It should be reiterated, however, that the determination of specific 
license terms and conditions, and the evaluation of whether such license 
terms and conditions are reasonable and demonstrably free of unfair 
discrimination, are not matters that are properly the subject of 
discussion or debate at a development meeting.65 
Doug Lichtman has offered four economic reasons explaining the use of 
FRAND commitments as opposed to price setting within SSOs: (1) 
“negotiations over patent validity and value would take enormous amounts of 
time,” (2) standard-setting is a process run by engineers rather than lawyers, (3) 
new technologies have uncertain value, and (4) FRAND commitments allow 
implementing firms to wait for additional information before agreeing on 
royalties.66  In general, it seems that limiting the agreement to FRAND 
commitment allows SSOs to avoid a feared liability for concerted exercise of 
 
61. On ex ante and ex post negotiations, see Farrell et al., supra, note 4, at 630. 
62. Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 6, at 671.  
63. Curran, supra note 47, at 992.  
64. Robert A. Skitol, Concerted Buying Power: Its Potential for Addressing the Patent Holdup 
Problem in Standard Setting, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 727, 728 (2005).  
65. AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS INSTITUTE, GUIDELINES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE ANSI PATENT POLICY, 7 (Oct. 2012) available at http://publicaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/
Documents/Standards%20Activities/American%20National%20Standards/Procedures,%20Guides,%
20and%20Forms/ANSI%20Patent%20Policy%20Guidelines%202012%20final.pdf.  
66. Doug Lichtman, Seventh Annual Baker Botts Lecture: Understanding the RAND 
Commitment, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1023, 1028–29 (2010-2011).  On SSOs and the pricing dilemma, see 
also Devlin, supra note 4, at 232–43. 
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pricing power, as well as allows thorough examinations of possibly relevant 
patents.  As put forth by Lichtman, the result of the adoption of a FRAND 
approach is that it “separates the negotiation over the details of a technology 
from the negotiation over its costs.”67 
In the same line, it is interesting to note that, contrary to many patent pools, 
most SSOs do not provide for control or arbitration once a standard has been 
adopted.68  However, two exceptions should be flagged here.  First, the Institute 
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) requires compulsory ex ante 
licensing disclosures, a feature that has been praised by the U.S. Antitrust 
Division but that remains almost unique in the industry.69  Second, VITA, an 
international trade association that develops standards for modular embedded 
computing systems, has created “an arbitration procedure to resolve disputes 
over members’ compliance with patent policy.”70  Here too, VITA’s initiative 
is quite unique in the SSOs field.71  For these reasons, once a standard has been 
accepted, FRAND commitments are difficult to police and implement in the 
absence of right holders’ good faith.  However, as stated by Mark Lemley, 
“SSO [intellectual property] rules have legal significance only to the extent they 
are enforceable.”72 
Still, patent holders abusing their ex post position are not free from liability, 
and many antitrust claims have thus been brought against firms violating 
FRAND terms commitments.73  Opportunism in licensing after standardization 
has first been reviewed in the now famous 1996 FTC Dell Computer case.74  
Since then, disputes have become increasingly frequent, both in front of the 
FTC and in front of courts.75  For example, in 2007, royalties requested by 
Qualcomm for its standard-essential UMTS patents were, successfully attacked 
by Broadcom and other competitors for violating Qualcomm’s FRAND 
 
67. Lichtman, supra note 66; see also Joseph Scott Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and 
Access Lock-in: RAND Licensing and the Theory of the Firm, 40 IND. L. REV. 351, 364–67 (2007).  
68. HESSE, supra note 11, at 10.  
69. Id. at 8. See also IEE STANDARDS ASSOCIATION, http://standards.ieee.org/ (last visited 
Aug. 2, 2013).   
70. See HESSE, supra note 11, at 10. See also, VITA: OPEN STANDARDS OPEN MARKETS, 
http://www.vita.com/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2013).   
71. HESSE, supra note 11, at 8, 10. 
72. Lemley, supra note 4, at 1909. 
73. On the refusing to license essential patents on FRAND terms see, e.g., Matthews, supra 
note 54 (updated Feb. 2013) (refusing to license an “essential” patent on FRAND terms).  On the 
antitrust theories of liability see, e.g., Lemley, supra note 4, at 1927–36.  
74. In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 618 (1996).  
75. For a more recent milestone FTC case see Rambus, Inc., 142 F.T.C. No. 9302, at 4, 2006-
2 Trade Cases P. 75364 (F.T.C.), 2006 WL 2330117, 2 (2006), where the FTC held that deceptive 
conduct of the type alleged in Dell Computer and Union Oil constituted “exclusionary conduct” under 
§ 2 of the Sherman Act as well as unlawful monopolization under § 5 of the FTC Act. 
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licensing terms commitment.76  As previously stated, the FRAND standard is 
nevertheless ambiguous and has not been expressly defined either by SSOs or 
by courts, although the Western District of Washington rendered the first 
judicial determination of a RAND royalty rate in April 2013 in the now famous 
Microsoft v. Motorola case.77  In that opinion, Judge Robart adopted a 
hypothetical bilateral negotiation approach to determine a reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory royalty rate for Motorola’s patented technologies, and 
applied the GeorgiaPacific framework and its fifteen factors in the FRAND 
context.78  In doing so, Judge Robart noted that a “judicial simulation of a 
hypothetical, bilateral negotiation under the RAND obligation logically will 
lead to a royalty rate that both parties would have found to be reasonable.”79  
However, the opinion modifies the GeorgiaPacific factors to take into account 
public interest considerations with respect to patent hold-ups, stacking 
concerns, as well as relative values of patented technologies.80  The Microsoft 
v. Motorola opinion is hence a big step in setting legal criteria to judicially 
determine FRAND and RAND commitments.  Aside from the Western District 
of Washington’s opinion, FRAND claims have nevertheless often questioned 
the ability of courts to judicially establish FRAND terms.  This questioned 
capacity coupled with the lack of substantial regulation by SSOs has 
consequently limited courts in interpreting and enforcing the content of 
FRAND licensing terms.81  Litigation with respect to FRAND terms is 
moreover long and costly for all sides. These conclusions flag a phenomenon 
already identified by Robert Merges in 1996: “[intellectual property] law has 
grown increasingly resistant to one of its traditional pathogens, the antitrust 
laws.”82  Although FRAND licensing commitments appear central to the 
policing of standard setting, practice hence shows that they have been very 
difficult to implement and enforce.  For these reasons, patent markets could be 
relevant in establishing the content of FRAND terms outside of courts, or as 
criteria for the court when interpreting FRAND terms (provided that we accept 
the premise that market price is fair and reasonable).  I will come back to the 
relevance of patent markets as tools in establishing FRAND terms in section 
 
76. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 305–06, 323 (3d Cir. 2007). See also, 
Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1248 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (characterizing such 
conduct as an attempt at “holding hostage the entire industry desiring to practice the . . . standard”).  
77. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10–1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217 (W.D. Wash., 
2013). 
78. Id. ¶ 87.  
79. Id. ¶ 91.  
80. Id. ¶¶ 111–13.  
81. On courts’ options for defining FRAND terms, see, e.g., Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 6, 
at 679–85.  
82. Merges, supra note 26, at 1294.  
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IV of this article. 
II.  THE EMERGENCE OF A PATENTS MARKET 
The patents market’s emerging process is difficult to map and analyze, as 
there are no official surveys documenting the content and evolution of the 
market.  Nevertheless, as the market grows in importance, some studies make 
it easier to grasp the essential information.  First, it seems that the market 
emerged in the United States (U.S.) and remains particularly attached to the 
U.S. territory. Indeed, as noted by a commentator, “the sheer size of the 
technology markets in the U.S., and the specificities of the U.S. regulatory and 
legal environment, make it the ideal place for the development of a patent 
market.”83  Unsurprisingly, the patents market is, for the moment, particularly 
strong in California and in Silicon Valley but the emergence of patent 
intermediaries such as IPXI has the potential to expand the phenomenon 
worldwide.  As for what triggered the emergence of a patents market, specialists 
point to the establishment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 
1982, as well as to the incentives brought by a new monetization strategy for 
patents and other intellectual property rights.84 Litigation threats that stem from 
increasingly patent-sensitive products, a growing need for defensive patents, 
the inadequacy of the available legal solutions, and a strategic necessity to 
avoid expensive and lengthy litigations are additional reasons that explain the 
emergence of an intellectual property market.85  One landmark event in this 
evolution is the private auction forum created by Ocean Tomo in 2005 where a 
patent portfolio was sold “out of bankruptcy for $15 million in 65 days.”86  
Following this success, Ocean Tomo held a live auction in April, 2006, where 
1,200 patents were sold for about $8.5 million.87  Interestingly, “one-half of the 
patents were sold ‘off the floor,’” i.e. after the auction once reserves had been 
reduced.88  The new market seemed to have had a quick effect.  A subsequent 
live auction followed, including copyrights and domain names, and met with 
even bigger success, with cumulative transactions of $23.9 million.89  In 
 
83. Ashby H. B. Monk, The emerging market for intellectual property: drivers, restrainers, 
and implications, 9(4) J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 469, 473 (2009).  
84. Id. at 474. See also James E. Malackowski et al., The Intellectual Property Marketplace: 
Emerging Transaction and Investment Vehicles, 27(2) LICENSING J. 1, 2 (Feb. 2007). (James 
Malackowski is IPXI Holdings’ Co-Chairman and Ocean Tomo’s Chairman and Chief Executive 
Officer). For an introduction on the Federal Circuit see, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal 
Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (1989).  
85. Monk, supra note 83, at 474–75.  
86. Malackowski et al., supra note 84, at 3.  
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
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response to the encouraging results of these live auctions, Ocean Tomo 
launched in 2006, in partnership with the American Stock Exchange, the Ocean 
Tomo 300® Patent Index (OTPAT).  OTPAT is the first index based on the 
value of patent assets90 and representing a diversified portfolio of 300 top 
companies.91  In 2007, Ocean Tomo also launched the US China IP 200™ 
Index, the world’s first index based on the value of both U.S. and Chinese 
intellectual property.92  The Index comprises the top 100 companies that own 
the most valuable U.S. patents relative to their book value and the 100 
companies that have the most valuable Chinese patents.  Another famous 
example of patent auctioning is Zoltar Satellite Alarm Systems (Zoltar)’s in 
October 2009 by Pluritas, a patent broker based in San Francisco.93  Zoltar held 
the patents for a personal alarm device that used GPS technology and 
navigational receivers.  After suing for infringement and settling with 
Qualcomm in 2001 and Motorola in 2005, Zoltar decided to avoid further legal 
fees and sold its patents in an auction “hoping for faster, simpler and less risky 
payoff.”94  Through increasing patent auctions, a market for patent assets 
emerged.  As stated by James Malackowski, IPXI Holdings’ Co-Chairman and 
Ocean Tomo’s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, “[t]he true success of 
the auctions has been the effect on the emerging market for IP.”95  Because of 
these market evolutions, patent brokers and intermediaries became increasingly 
important actors in the intellectual property landscape.  In the copyright 
industry, platforms like the Creative Commons (a nonprofit organization that 
enables the diffusion of copyrights through standardized copyright licenses) 
also participated in the creation of an intellectual property market.96  Altogether, 
these developments created the perfect conditions for the launching of 
intellectual property exchange platforms where buyers can purchase licenses 
according to rules and values established by the market.  With respect to patent 
assets, two important market platforms are worth mentioning as milestones in 
the intellectual property market creation process: the GreenXchange and IPXI. 
GreenXchange is a nonprofit web-based marketplace launched in Davos, 
 
90. See OCEAN TOMO: INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL EQUITY, http://www.oceantomo.com/
productsandservices/investments/indexes/ot300 (last visited Aug. 2, 2013).  
91. On the design of the index see, e.g., Malackowski et al., supra note 84, at 4–8.  
92. See US China IP 200TM Index, OCEAN TOMO: INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL EQUITY, 
http://www.oceantomo.com/productsandservices/investments/us-china-ip-200 (last visited Aug. 2, 
2013).  
93. For the whole story, see Steve Lohr, Patent Auctions Offer Protections to Inventors, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2009, at B1. 
94. Id.  
95. McClure & Malackowski, supra note 17, at 33.  
96. For more information on the Creative Commons, see About, CREATIVE COMMONS, 
http://creativecommons.org/about.  
CHUFFART-FINSTERWALD FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/23/2014  1:41 PM 
2014] PATENT MARKETS 355 
 
Switzerland, during the World Economic Forum in January 2010, by Nike, 
Creative Commons and Best Buy.  It provides a standardized license structure 
whereby intellectual property holders can control the level at which and to 
whom their intellectual assets are available.97  Intellectual property holders can 
thus retain the rights they believe to be critical to maintaining their competitive 
advantage, and licensing agreements are especially designed to allow the 
necessary flexibility.  As noted by Eric Lane, intellectual property lawyer and 
patent attorney specialized in green patents, “the GreenXchange platform 
enables the patent owner to make its proprietary green technologies available 
for transfer without compromising competitiveness.”98  This feature should 
encourage the contribution of more valuable patents. Three years after its 
launch, more than 400 patents are available through the GreenXchange 
licensing platform99 including Nike’s environmentally preferred rubber.100  In 
addition to the standardized patent-licensing platform, GreenXchange provides 
partners with collaborations that offer technical assistance to companies 
licensing through the GreenXchange.101  Arguably, the platform does not meet 
all the conditions of a free market because it allows rights holders to retain 
certain rights and to arbitrarily choose which party they enter into an agreement 
with.  These features, moreover, go against a maximized diffusion of 
technologies.  The GreenXchange is nevertheless an interesting illustration of 
a patents market especially created in order to enhance diffusion of technology, 
environmental technologies in casu. 
IPXI is a financial exchange launched in 2012 that allows for non-exclusive 
licensing and trading of intellectual property rights with market-based pricing 
and standardized terms through Unit License Rights contracts.  It was 
conceived of and founded by Ocean Tomo, LLC and already carries 55,000 
patents from Ford, Sony America, Philips, Com-Pac, MetaPower, Hewlett-
Packard, Panasonic or the University of South California.  In May of 2012, 
IPXI adopted its Exchange Rulebook102 and the platform is expected to 
 
97. See About The Greenxchange, GREENXCHANGE http://greenxchange.cc/info/about.  
98. ERIC L. LANE, CLEAN TECH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ECO-MARKS, GREEN PATENTS, 
AND GREEN INNOVATION 212 (Oxford University Press, 2011).  
99. The breakdown of the 400 patents is: 237 apparel patents, 167 devices patents, 17 materials 
patents and 17 method patents. See GREENXCHANGE, supra note 97.   
100. See 463 Assets, GREENXCHANGE, http://greenxchange.cc/info/release/1-23-2011 (last 
visited Aug. 2, 2013).  
101. For example, on “January 11, 2011 the GreenXchange held an in-person Collaboratory 
that included attendance by Brooks, Nike, New Balance, Oregon based non-profits, the University of 
Oregon, University of Washington, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.  The focus of the 
meeting was on providing technical assistance to footwear companies licensing the environmentally 
preferred rubber (EPR) patent offered through the GreenXchange.” See 463 Assets, supra note 100.  
102. See Company Updates, IPXI TRADING INNOVATION, http://www.ipxi.com/news-
events/news/company-updates/100-ipxi-releases-updated-market-rulebook.html (last visited Aug. 2, 
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officially launch in the summer of 2013.  IPXI is certainly one of the most 
sophisticated patent markets at present and analysis with respect to legal 
opportunities offered by intellectual property markets will hence focus on IPXI 
as an illustration.  The upcoming section will thus introduce IPXI’s main 
features. 
III.  A MARKET ILLUSTRATION: IPXI AND UNIT LICENSE RIGHTS103 
IPXI is a financial exchange that allows for non-exclusive licensing and 
trading of intellectual property rights on standardized terms.  In its own words, 
IPXI aspires to act as “a neutral transaction facilitator”104 in the financial 
exchange of intellectual property rights.  IPXI is membership-based, and 
entities that are eligible for membership are corporations, universities and 
laboratories.  To date, IPXI is certainly one of the most sophisticated patent 
markets and its approach to licensing has been quite singular.  The present 
section will thus introduce IPXI, IPXI’s functions, and its most unique feature: 
the Unit License Rights. 
For an intellectual property asset to be traded on its platform, IPXI must 
first enter into an agreement with the intellectual property owner.  The owner 
will either sell its rights to IPXI or license its rights through an exclusive master 
license.105  The latter option gives IPXI the authority to sublicense rights and 
enforce traded rights.  Singularly, IPXI’s marketplace functions through the 
introduction of Unit License Rights (ULR) contracts: exchange-traded non-
exclusive license right products, offered on a non-discriminatory basis and on 
standard terms.  ULR contracts will be priced and sold on a standardized 
technology-unit basis.  Each unit-base will be uniquely determined by IPXI 
according to the underlying technology and each unit-base will be a 
measurement of the patented technology.  ULR contracts therefore transform 
traditional private licensing of technology into tradable products.  Contracts can 
be based on or include a patent issued in any jurisdiction and all patents 
included in a ULR contract are publically disclosed.  Each ULR contract gives 
the buyer the right to use the asset offered for a pre-established number of 
instances in the manufacturing and/or sale of a product or use of a process.  For 
example, if a buyer wishes to produce 1,000 solar panels using a patented 
 
2013).  
103. Unless otherwise specified, all the information in this section comes from IPXI’s website.  
See Fact Sheet, IPXI, http://www.ipxi.com/public-files/IPXI-fact-sheet.pdf; IPXI, 
http://www.ipxi.com/. 
104. Frequently Asked Questions, IPXI TRADING INNOVATION, http://www.ipxi.com/inside-
ipxi/faq.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2013) (hereinafter FAQs IPXI).  
105. Cameron Gray, A New Era in IP Licensing: The Unit License RightTM Program, 28(10) 
LICENSING J. 27, 29 (Nov./Dec. 2008).  
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device available through IPXI in the form of a ULR, the buyer will thus 
purchase 1,000 ULRs.  Interestingly, IPXI requires that all patented 
technologies or applications held by the intellectual property owner, at the time 
of issuance or later developed, must be included in the ULR contract if they are 
essential to the unit-base. In fact, an entire patent pool can be the subject of a 
single ULR issuance!  IPXI will require that the right holder obtain an 
independent expert opinion on the question of essential patents.106  Although it 
is still unclear what IPXI will consider ‘essential,’ the opportunities offered by 
the ULR approach are very interesting.  Nevertheless, it seems that it will not 
be compulsory for intellectual property owners to include rights to related 
know-how, even though IPXI offers the possibility to do so through the 
establishment of a Know-How Warrant. 
To ensure the offer of high quality intellectual property products, each 
potential ULR is assessed.  IPXI vets ULR contract opportunities based on 
quality standards determined from an abstract of the technology, business 
opportunities, the identity of the full portfolio as well as of any core patents 
within the portfolio, market identifications (such as identification of 
prospective licensees), and identification of any encumbrances (including most 
favored licensees obligations).  After the assessment, ULR contract offerings 
will take place under two possible mechanisms: a sealed bid auction with an 
undisclosed minimum price, or customized offerings to ensure demand-based 
pricing. Offerings will be subject to price banding so that market prices reflect 
actual rates of technology.  It will nevertheless be necessary to wait until the 
platform is operational to assess whether the pricing mechanism offered by 
IPXI will be truly market-based. Interestingly, sales will be limited to entities 
that certify that they are buying for their own use and/or for qualified 
institutional buyers.  The agreement between IPXI and the ULR purchaser will 
furthermore carry an obligation to report consumption of the acquired ULR(s).  
ULR contracts being tradable units, a secondary market will allow purchasers 
to resell unused units. Revenues from ULR sales will be “divided with IPXI 
typically retaining 20 percent.”107 
According to IPXI, its objectives include efficient technology transfer, 
reasonable market-based pricing, mitigation of intellectual property-related 
price risk, enhanced transparency in the intellectual property marketplace, and 
valuation of intellectual property assets.  In a statement presenting enforcement 
intentions regarding the planned exchange of ULRs, the Antitrust Division of 
 
106. Letter from William J. Baer, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. 
Department of Justice, to Garrard R. Beeney, Sullivan & Cromwell, at 4 (Mar. 26, 2013) (IPXI, Inc. 
Business Review Request).  
107. Id. at 5.  
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the U.S. Department of Justice noted that: “IPXI’s proposed exchange 
potentially could generate efficiencies for the IP marketplace and encourage 
innovation through increased licensing efficiency, sublicense transferability, 
and greater transparency.”108  Nevertheless, the statement also warned that the 
IPXI platform could raise antitrust issues, including “the pooling of patents 
from multiple patent holders, the listing of competing ULRs, and the sharing of 
competitively sensitive information.”109  In an amended submission, IPXI 
stated that it “will not permit competing ULR offerings on the exchange.”110  It 
will however be necessary to wait until the platform is operational to see 
whether the competitive issues raised by the Antitrust Division materialize or 
not. 
The ULR contract mechanism should allow for standard licensing terms, 
regardless of company size, market position, or relationship with the ULR 
contract owner.  IPXI advocates that its market-based pricing allows for 
FRAND licensing.111  In May 2012, IPXI adopted its Exchange Rulebook,112 
and the platform officially launched in June 2013, with two offerings: a stored 
value card technology held by patentee JPMorgan Chase, and an OLED 
technology for display screens held by patentee Philips.113 “The OLED ULR 
contract offering will be issued in three tranches: Tranche A; Tranche B; and 
Tranche C.”114 The fair market price of the OLED ULR contract, estimated by 
IPXI, is forty-five dollars for five square meters of OLED display per ULR 
contract.115 “The Tranche A OLED ULR contract price is $36.00 per ULR 
contract. The Tranche C price will be the fair market price.”116 Therefore, 
except for Tranche C, the pricing mechanism is not fully market-based, but 
already offers great opportunities in terms of fairness, as it allows for all 
participants to have access to technologies at the same price.117 In particular, 
this is important for small market participants such as start-ups, universities, 
 
108. Id. at 6. (The statement was undertaken pursuant to the Department of Justice’s Business 
Review Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (2012)). 
109. Id. at 8.  
110. Id. at 4. 
111. See FAQs IPXI, supra note 104. 
112. See Press Releases, IPXI (May 4, 2013), available at http://www.ipxi.com/media/
newsreleases/Intellectual-Property-Exchange-International-Announces-Exchange-Rules (last visited 
April 15, 2014). 
113. See URL Contracts Overview, IPXI available at http://www.ipxi.com/offerings/ulr-
contracts.html (last visited April 15, 2014).  
114. Preliminary Offering Memorandum ULR Contracts, Series OLED, IPXI 7 (June 5, 2013) 
http://72775af0e87bf6ae26d0-9bfc6ca5134d5b990b8db1540dcc115b.r43.cf1.rackcdn.com/uploads/
offering_memorandum/document/2676/Offering_Memorandum_-_Series_OLED.pdf. 
115. See id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
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and actors in developing countries who do not enjoy favorable leverage in 
negotiations.118 In the upcoming section, I will assess whether patent markets 
such as IPXI can be a relevant incentive to enhanced technology diffusion as 
well as an appropriate tool to establish and fulfill FRAND licensing terms. 
IV.  PATENT MARKETS: TOOLS TOWARDS ENHANCED TECHNOLOGY 
DIFFUSION AND FULFILLMENT OF FRAND LICENSING COMMITMENTS? 
We saw that technology diffusion and FRAND licensing commitments are 
necessary to enhance innovation, meet global challenges, and develop sound 
standards.  In this section I will thus identify and assess which patent markets’ 
features favor technology diffusion, as well as the possibility of using patent 
markets in order to interpret and implement FRAND licensing commitments. 
A.  Features Favoring Technology Diffusion 
Intellectual property markets seem to present many advantages in favor of 
technology diffusion.  As stated by a commentator reacting to the launching of 
the IPXI platform, “[t]his is simpler, faster and cheaper than the lawyer-
intensive process of negotiating bilateral licenses for intellectual property, the 
high cost of which discriminates against small companies, leaves patents 
unused on the shelf and hampers innovation.”119  In making technologies more 
accessible, intellectual property markets should trigger enhanced technology 
diffusion.  I will now briefly present five features that appear relevant in 
enhancing technology diffusion. 
1.  Time Efficiency 
Licensing intellectual property rights takes a lot of time.  As stated by a 
specialist in the field, “licensing remains highly inefficient, it often take 6 to 18 
months to complete a deal, and this comes at a significant costs.”120  With the 
help of intellectual property market platforms, it is or will be possible to 
purchase intellectual property rights or enter into licensing agreements within 
days or weeks.  In a time when technologies are often outdated after a few 
months, it seems absolutely necessary to be able to conclude licensing 
agreements or purchase intellectual property rights very rapidly.  Time 
efficiency is also important because it strongly decreases the legal costs of 
transactions.  The adoption of a time efficient approach to intellectual property 
licensing and trading should thus enhance technology diffusion by offering 
 
118. Id. 
119. An intellectual property exchange marketplace of ideas, ECONOMIST, May 12, 2012, 
available at http://www.economist.com/node/21554540.  
120. Malackowski et al., supra note 84, at 3. 
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quicker and cheaper access to technologies, benefiting buyers and sellers as 
well as licensors and licensees, and, ultimately, final consumers. 
2.  Transparent Access 
Intellectual property markets are usually transparent platforms. In the IPXI 
system, ULR prices are for example publicly available.  Transparency is very 
important as a factor enhancing technology diffusion because it builds trust 
among participants and thus encourages licensing and intellectual property 
trading.  Transparency also leads to adequate price discovery.  This is 
particularly relevant for small actors such as start-ups, university laboratories, 
and research centers that do not enjoy leverage in negotiations.  As stated by 
commentators, publication of patent assignment and license terms “will help 
rationalize patent transaction, turning them from secret, one-off negotiations 
into a real, working market for patents.”121  In the same line, IPXI’s obligation 
to purchase for oneself and to use purchased ULRs within one-year aims at 
avoiding patent trolls and enhancing the platform’s transparency.  It is expected 
that the availability of a transparent market will encourage actors to enter into 
more frequent licensing agreements and ultimately foster more innovative 
R&D schemes. 
3.  Equitable and Non-Exclusive Access to Technologies 
Intellectual property rights holders have the right to refuse licenses on any 
terms.122  As a rule, firms tend therefore to avoid entering into licensing 
agreements with competitors.  However, we saw with post-standard licensing 
commitment violations, and notably the Broadcom case illustration,123 that 
defensive behaviors by firms are detrimental to innovation and technology 
diffusion, and sometimes anticompetitive under the Sherman Act.  Small actors 
in particular are prevented from having access to necessary technologies in 
order to develop innovative products. At the international level, discriminatory 
licensing strategies with respect to pharmaceutical, agrochemical, and 
environmental technologies have put a heavy burden on developing countries.  
Often discriminatory licensing prevents developing countries from gaining 
 
121. Mark A. Lemley & Nathan Myhrvold, How to Make a Patent Market, 38 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 257, 258 (2007) available at http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=2304&context=hlr&sei-redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.com%2Fscholar%
3Fhl%3Den%26q%3DHOW%2BTO%2BMAKE%2BA%2BPATENT%2BMARKET%26btnG%3D
%26as_sdt%3D1%252C50%26as_sdtp%3D#search=%22HOW%20MAKE%20PATENT%20MAR
KET%22.  
122. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006). See generally United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 
(1926); Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429–30 (1908).  
123. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 305-6, 323 (3d Cir. 2007). 
CHUFFART-FINSTERWALD FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/23/2014  1:41 PM 
2014] PATENT MARKETS 361 
 
access to technologies necessary to their development.124  By providing non-
discriminatory and non-exclusive access to intellectual property assets, 
intellectual property markets such as IPXI ensure that all interested actors can 
have access to technologies, while allowing for revenue maximization for rights 
holders.  However, it should be flagged that patent markets’ relevance is limited 
to the assets included in the market, and that therefore it will always be 
necessary for those acquiring rights through a market to make sure that the 
technology they wish to produce is not covered by intellectual property rights 
outside of the market. 
4.  Fair Pricing and Reduction of Legal Costs in Licensing Process 
It is still unsure how patent markets will handle the pricing of patents.  As 
discussed in Section III, in the IPXI system ULR contract offerings will take 
place under two possible mechanisms: a sealed bid auction with an undisclosed 
minimum price, or customized offerings to ensure demand-based pricing, after 
an initial assessment by IPXI.  It will therefore be necessary to wait until the 
platform is operational to assess whether the pricing mechanism offered by 
IPXI will be a truly market-based and to thus assess the opportunities presented 
with respect to fair pricing.  Nevertheless, potential for market-determined price 
is an important feature of patent markets.  It would allow for an industry as 
whole to ultimately agree on what price they are ready to pay for a given 
technology.  But the pricing mechanism, even as presented now, already offers 
great opportunities in terms of fairness as it allows for all participants to have 
access to technologies at the same price.  In particular, this is important for 
small market participants such as start-ups and universities who do not enjoy 
favorable leverage in negotiations.  As underlined by a specialist in the field, 
“many small to mid-cap companies refrain from open innovation policies 
because licenses are unilaterally determined by [intellectual property] owners 
with stronger bargaining positions.”125  In a market approach however, all 
actors should be equal in their capacity to gain access to technologies.  With 
 
124. India for example has had tremendous difficulties in entering into licensing agreements 
with respect to chlorofluocarbon substitutes after its ratification of the Montreal Protocol.  See notably 
U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2001 – MAKING NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
WORK FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, at 109 (Oxford University Press 2001), available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-report-2001; Jayashree Watal, Case Study 3* 
India: The Issue of Technology Transfer in the Context of the Montreal Protocol, United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, Achieving Objectives of Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements: A Package of Trade Measures and Positive Measures, at 45-46, UNCTAD/ITCD/TED/6 
(Veena Jha & Ulrich Hoffman eds.). 
125. Matthew F. Jones, IP Lawyer Finds Opportunity in New Industry: The Intellectual 
Property Exchange, 58 THE FED. LAWYER, 16, 17 (Jan. 2011) (interviewing Ian McClure, an 
intellectual property transactional associate at IPXI). 
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respect to IPXI for example, all participants can acquire ULR contracts on an 
as-needed basis and on standardized terms.  Patent markets hence appear as an 
answer to the fundamental issue of leverage in licensing and trading 
negotiations, and the emergence of these markets will undoubtedly give new 
actors access to technology.  For sure, market-determined prices are not free, 
and in instances such as the licensing of medicines or environmental 
technologies, may be still considered too high.  For this reason, patent markets 
should not be seen as an alternative to national and international negotiations 
on differentiated licensing regimes for technologies that are vital to human 
health or to the mitigation of climate change.  Because market prices are also 
interesting for rights holders in maximizing their revenues, the market approach 
furthermore ensures that competitive products will be offered. 
5.  Inclusion of Patented Technology or Application Necessary to a Unit in 
ULR Contracts 
In the IPXI system, ULR contracts require that all patented technologies or 
applications held by rights’ holders, at the time of issuance or later developed, 
which are essential to a unit-base must be included in the ULR contract.126  
Rights holders also have the possibility to add a voluntary Know-How Warrant.  
In the absence of more details on these features, it will be necessary to wait and 
see how the inclusion obligation will be implemented and what will be 
considered as an ‘essential’ technology.  The inclusion of patented technologies 
or applications necessary to licensed rights is fundamental from a technology 
diffusion perspective because it allows for technologies to be properly 
understood and therefore used to their full extent.  One can therefore hope that 
the inclusion obligation will be strictly implemented and efficiently supervised.  
With respect to the definition of ‘essential,’ it seems that IPXI will have to find 
a working balance between licensors’ and licensees’ interests. 
This brief overview demonstrates that there are many intellectual property 
market features that are relevant tools in encouraging enhanced technology 
diffusion.  As stated by a specialist in the field, “the provision of efficient 
outlets for monetizing IP simultaneously facilitates the transfer of technology 
and accelerates innovation.”127  Of the four issues identified in section I.A., 
intellectual property markets address three, such as the lack of transparency in 
the agreement processes, leverage concerns, as well as efficiency issues.  In its 
statement presenting enforcement intentions regarding the planned exchange of 
IPXI’s ULRs, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice flagged 
that “IPXI’s proposal has the potential to facilitate more efficient licensing by 
 
126. FAQs IPXI, supra note 104. 
127. McClure & Malackowski, supra note 17, at 1.  
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increasing transparency regarding the patents in a ULR and obviating the need 
for costly bilateral negotiations.”128  The statement further recognized that these 
benefits might ultimately profit downstream consumers.129 
From the point of view of right holders, the incentive to join patent markets 
first comes from lower transaction and enforcement costs.130  Second, it is fair 
to assume that right holders join patent markets because they are equally 
interested in purchasing and entering into agreements with other right holders.  
Third, patent markets offer a responsive valuation mechanism, a “fundamental 
earmark of a viable private transactional institution.”131  The success of the IPXI 
platform proves that there is a strong incentive for right holders to join and 
participate in patents markets.  IPXI’s Founding Members include Com-Pac 
International, Ford Global Technologies LLC, Hewlett-Packard Company, 
Philips Electronics, Sony Corporation of America, Columbia University 
Technology Ventures, and the University of Southern California.132  These 
“Founding Members have committed to sponsor offerings on the Exchange 
with an aggregate target market value in excess of $750 million.”133 
However, and as previously discussed, patent and other intellectual 
property markets will not be the ultimate solution to all the challenges facing 
intellectual property regimes nowadays.  It is therefore doubtful that intellectual 
property markets can fully address the industry’s general dissatisfaction with 
the available legal framework.  Furthermore, it cannot be guaranteed that patent 
markets will carry all or most of the necessary, edge-cutting technologies.  
Arguably, patent markets may appear more or less relevant depending on the 
industry concerned.134  Finally, patent markets do not address issues of free 
licensing and may be ill suited to trade technologies that are vital to human 
health or to the mitigation of climate change.  But patent markets are certainly 
a material step in enhancing technology diffusion while bringing appropriate 
answers to legal challenges such as issues of discrimination in licensing.  I will 
 
128. Letter from William J. Baer, supra note 106, at 6–7. 
129. Id. at 7. 
130. On the incentive to join collective intellectual property rights institutions see, e.g., Merges, 
supra note 26, at 1324–27. This was also recognized in the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department 
of Justice’s statement, which noted that “efficiencies may also benefit rights’ holders who currently 
expend resources to establish a licensing program.”  Letter from William J. Baer, supra note 106, at 7.  
131. Merges, supra note 26, at 1311.  
132. See Founding Members, IPXI TRADING INNOVATION, http://www.ipxi.com/inside-
ipxi/founding-members.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2013).  
133. See U.S. Department of Justice Concludes Eight-Month Review of IPXI Licensing Model, 
IPXI TRADING INNOVATION, http://www.ipxi.com/component/content/article/12-news/press-releases/
90-doj-concludes-review-of-ipxi.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2013).  
134. If we look at IPXI’s members, we nevertheless see that they cover a very broad range of 
industries.  See FAQs IPXI, supra note 104.  
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now assess the relevance of market-established patent licensing prices as 
criteria in interpreting FRAND licensing terms in, and outside of, courts. 
B.  Market-Established Prices as Criteria in Interpreting FRAND Licensing 
Terms 
We saw in section I.B. that although FRAND licensing commitments 
appear central to the policing of standard setting, practice has shown that they 
have been very difficult to implement and enforce.  More than fifteen years ago, 
the FTC, followed by courts, started to sanction patent hold-up conduct and 
interpret FRAND licensing commitments.  But it has been a difficult task for 
both the FTC and courts,135 leading some commentators to argue that these 
institutions were ill-suited to interpret FRAND terms. For example, Professor 
Merges stated that “[i]n the intellectual property field, . . .  the assumption of 
court valuation is unrealistic.”136  Provided that we accept the premise that 
market price is fair and reasonable, patent markets seem relevant as a tool to 
interpret and fulfill FRAND licensing commitments.  Moreover, they appear 
useful in providing non-discriminatory access to licensing agreements. 
In Broadcom, the Third Circuit concluded that Broadcom had stated claims 
for monopolization and attempted monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman 
Act, reversing in part the District Court’s dismissal of the case for failure to 
state a claim.137  Qualcomm had promised to license its patents on FRAND 
terms but had reneged on those promises after it succeeded in having its 
technology included in a standard.  Nevertheless, the District Court held that 
Qualcomm enjoyed a legally sanctioned monopoly in the patented 
technology.138  In reversing in part and remanding the case for further 
proceedings consistent with its opinion, the Third Circuit recognized and 
sanctioned Qualcomm’s anticompetitive conduct.  However, it fell short of 
interpreting the content of Qualcomm’s FRAND licensing commitment.  In 
2009, Qualcomm and Broadcom reached settlement and entered into mutual 
licensing agreements.139  “Under the agreement, the companies have granted 
certain rights to each other under their respective patent portfolios.”140  After 
 
135. As flagged in section I.B., a notable exception to that respect is the recent opinion in the 
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola case. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10–1823JLR, 2013 WL 
2111217 (W.D. Wash., 2013). 
136. Merges, supra note 26, at 1308.  
137. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 305-17, 323 (3d Cir. 2007). 
138. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., No05–3350 (MLC), 2006 WL 2528545, at 5–12. 
(D.N.J., 2006). 
139. See Press Release, Broadcom, Qualcomm and Broadcom Reach Settlement and Patent 
Agreement, available at http://www.broadcom.com/press/release.php?id=s379764 (last visited Aug. 
2, 2013). 
140. Id. 
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years of costly judicial proceedings, the parties decided to settle their dispute 
outside of courts. 
The Third Circuit acknowledged the existence of a FRAND licensing 
obligation in Broadcom, but without giving substance to the obligation we can 
wonder how holdings on FRAND licensing commitments can succeed in 
ensuring that deceived competitors will actually gain fair, reasonable, and non-
discriminatory access to technologies included in standards.  Courts’ behaviors 
can nevertheless be explained by the lack of transparency in the licensing 
industry.  Indeed, courts and experts may well be unable to assess and establish 
fair and reasonable licensing terms for that only few private actors know what 
these terms should be and have no interest in disclosing them.  However, it 
seems necessary to reach more satisfactory outcomes. 
As presented in section I.B., and as underlined by the FTC in its statement 
before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary in July 2012, 
remedies that reduce the chance of patent hold-up can encourage innovation by 
increasing certainty for firms investing in standard-compliant products and 
complementary technologies.  Reducing hold-up also better aligns the reward 
from innovation with its true value to consumers.141  The possibility of 
developing a market/efficiency-based framework for evaluating FRAND 
licensing terms has been suggested by Daniel Swanson and William Baumol.142  
Building upon their approach, I propose that patent markets appear relevant in 
assisting courts when establishing FRAND licensing terms or in fulfilling these 
terms outside of courts.  Actually, IPXI advocates that its “market-based pricing 
allows for [FRAND] licensing.”143 
There are three cumulative elements in FRAND terms: fairness, 
reasonableness, as well as non-discrimination.  Patent markets can fulfill these 
elements.  First, we saw in section IV.A. that most markets have taken a non-
discriminatory as well as non-exclusive approach to trading and licensing.  This 
is notably the case of IPXI.  Intellectual property market platforms could hence 
be used in order for competitors to have access to necessary intellectual 
property assets once a standard has been set.  Second, to the extent that market-
established pricing is ensured, such prices seem fair in the sense that all actors, 
regardless of their leverage power, will benefit from the same price for a given 
intellectual property asset.  Third, market-established prices should appear 
reasonable in the sense that they will be established by the purchasing industry 
itself. In its statement presenting enforcement intentions regarding the planned 
 
141. Oversight of the Impact on Competition of Exclusion Orders to Enforce Standard-
Essential Patents: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 3, at 9–10.  
142. Daniel G. Swanson & William J. Baumol, Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (RAND) 
Royalties, Standards Selection, and Control of Market Power, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2006).  
143. See FAQs IPXI, supra note 104. 
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exchange of IPXI’s ULRs, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of 
Justice noted that “[i]f IPXI’s model can facilitate and advance F/RAND 
licensing, it may generate significant efficiencies.”144  This statement 
establishes that the application of patent markets to the implementation of 
FRAND licensing commitments is absolutely realistic.  As stated earlier, 
market-established prices differ from free licensing but a free licensing 
approach was never envisaged in FRAND licensing negotiations.  Because 
most patent markets meet the three cumulative conditions of FRAND terms, 
they seem relevant in either guiding courts when interpreting FRAND 
commitment’s content, or in implementing FRAND commitments by making 
the technology at stake available at fair and non-discriminatory prices.  Patent 
markets are furthermore appropriate in the FRAND licensing scheme because 
they allow for quick settlement.  They are hence relevant tools for SSOs, R&D 
actors, and courts, even if, as stated by a distinguished commentator, 
intellectual property assets “are more like works of art than stocks”145 and will 
therefore always remain difficult to evaluate. 
CONCLUSION 
While our everyday life depends on interconnected cutting-edge 
technologies, many technological challenges are still awaiting.  Technology 
diffusion and FRAND licensing commitments are necessary to enhance 
innovation, meet global challenges, and develop sound standards.  Because the 
current available legal options are not sufficient in promoting technology 
diffusion and in implementing FRAND licensing commitments, this article 
suggests that emerging patent markets could be relevant tools in assisting both 
interests.  My assessment demonstrated that patent markets can enhance 
technology diffusion by providing efficient, transparent, and equitable access 
to technologies at fair market prices.  I equally suggested that patent markets 
such as the IPXI platform provide innovative strategies, allowing for patented 
technologies and other necessary applications to be included in a licensing or 
trading transaction.  With respect to the implementation of FRAND 
commitments, I established that most patent markets fulfill the three cumulative 
conditions of FRAND terms, i.e. fairness, reasonableness, and non-
discrimination.  Patent markets therefore seem relevant in either guiding courts 
when interpreting the content of FRAND commitments or in implementing 
such commitments.  For these reasons, I believe that patent markets present 
very interesting opportunities for both technology diffusion and for the 
implementation of FRAND licensing commitments.  Moreover, right holders 
 
144. Letter from William J. Baer, supra note 106, at 7. 
145. Lohr, supra note 93.  
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equally seem to find strategic interests in the patent markets.  The emerging 
markets are hence hopeful developments in the intellectual property world.  
However, it is important to underline that there will be so much the markets 
will be able to do and that they alone cannot be the answer to all the tremendous 
challenges faced by intellectual property regimes nowadays.  While we can 
look forward to the opportunities brought by intellectual property markets, 
scholars, and practitioners must therefore continue to think about efficient and 
innovative legal developments so that intellectual property regimes meet 
today’s society needs. 
 
